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ABSTRACT. The essay discusses law’s inability to address the phenomenon of
human suﬀering and, at the same time, investigates a possible theoretical kinship
between Walter Benjamin’s notion of ‘the expressionless’ and Emmanuel Levinas’s
understanding of suﬀering as the foundation of an interhuman ethics. The kinship
between Levinas and Benjamin is examined with reference to suﬀering in the
visual arts and, more speciﬁcally, in Matthias Gru¨newald’s Isenheim Altarpiece
and Francis Bacon’s cruciﬁxion triptychs. The essay argues that in the cruciﬁxion
scenes of both Gru¨newald’s medieval altarpiece and Bacon’s triptychs, suﬀering is
what constitutes ‘the expressionless’. After every detail of the image, every ele-
ment of attribute, motif, composition and colour have been accurately depicted, a
residue still remains, an ethical truth that cannot be appropriated into a mean-
ingful unity but that nevertheless calls for a response. While law must always give
suﬀering a utilitarian value in its attempts to assign responsibility for the injury
occurred, the essay argues that the fragmentariness in all true art that Benjamin
calls ‘the expressionless’ is akin to Levinas’s understanding of the constitutional
uselessness of suﬀering, its essence as ‘for nothing’.
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ETHICS AND SUFFERING
Why does law seem to fail so consistently in its attempts to address
human suffering?
Modern law is dedicated to the procedural formality of the trial.
Within the trial, law imposes narrative meaning to suffering and
consequently gives it a utilitarian value in the task of assigning
responsibility. Even truth commissions and other institutional
applications of transitional justice that are often seen as a potential
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antidote to law’s formal limitations work essentially in the same way.
The trivialisation of suffering through causal narratives – ‘x injured y
by doing z’ – may perhaps assist in the therapeutic continuation of a
damaged social order, but it falls necessarily short of any profound
way of coming to terms with the agony of the injured individual. The
law views injury primarily as a breach against itself regardless of
whether we are talking about criminal or civil wrong. The trial fails to
satisfy the Kantian categorical imperative by using the injury suffered
by a human being as a means to reinstate its own authority.
Accordingly, this essay will claim that in order to be able to deal with
the trauma in a way that could involve the taking place of a genuine
ethical dimension, suffering would have to be, as Emmanuel Levinas
argues, considered as ‘meaningless’ and ‘useless’, as ‘for nothing’ in a
radically non-utilitarian way.1
But instead of discussing how signifying narratives trivialise suf-
fering in the workings of the trial that would be the most obvious
example from the world of law, this essay focuses on how human
agony is portrayed in art. Why has one artistic portrayal of suffering
had such devastating cultural effects whereas another seemingly
similar work of art fails to move us in the same way? Why does one
portrayal ring ‘truer’ than another? The same basic idea of the ethical
dimension of ‘useless’ and ‘meaningless’ suffering is thus carried over
to the domain of the visual arts: the portrayal of suffering is ‘pure’ if
it manages to resist and to withhold the narratives that usually sat-
urate the imagery with meaning.
The reason why Levinas’s ethics has caused such violent tremors
in the interdisciplinary study of law and the humanities is not because
it is yet another theoretically disguised attempt to revive the longing
for transcendence of traditional natural law but, rather, because
taking Levinas’s radical humanism seriously would require such a
thoroughly revised understanding of law itself. Even before self-
knowledge, before I am able to utter the words ‘I am’ – and the
substitution of the passive voice with the ﬁrst person singular is sig-
niﬁcant for me here – I must have a necessary relationship with the
Other. It is not a relationship that is prescribed or regulated by either
internal or external laws, because only the Other makes prescription
possible to begin with. So while the law claims that it requires me to
1 Another reply might claim that law is not meant to address suﬀering in an
ethical way. While this view can be supported with reasonable arguments, the
underlying ontological assumption betrays a very bleak understanding of what
law is.
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express love for my neighbour in a variety of ways, it can only do so
because the Other has already appeared to me in her irreducible
majesty and strangeness.
In this way Levinas’s ethics is ‘pre-ontological’ and the ‘ﬁrst phi-
losophy’; the Other precedes the self-awareness of my Being, my
inclination to assimilate the world into a plurality of my likenesses,
into a totality. But in the midst of my ego-centric frenzy to assimilate
and appropriate, the Other abruptly appears to me as a face that
resists my efforts to absorb her into my world. The face presents itself
to me as a countenance that my inclination to exist wishes to negate by
making it part of my world, and in this sense the Other is immediately
vulnerable. But this very vulnerability also calls to me as an appeal
that requires a response. Responsibility, literally my ability to respond
to the appeal of the Other, is the fundamental ethical relationship
that precedes any attempts to prescribe what my response should
substantively be.
Nowhere can the appeal of the Other be heard more clearly than in
the phenomenon of suffering. In the late essay ‘Useless Suffering’,
Levinas claims that suffering includes within itself an apparent con-
tradiction. It is surely data, a quantiﬁable fact that can be traced into
the consciousness of the victim and that medical pain research can
duly verify. But the very nature of suffering prevents from ordering
its data into a meaningful whole or unity. The contradiction that
arises from the impossibility to give this veriﬁable data meaning
accounts for suffering’s misery, for its woe. Woeful and meaningless
suffering is always passive. Passivity is, however, not understood in
opposition to activity, but as a vulnerability or an ordeal that is in
essence even more passive than experience. And this is what makes
suffering an evil.2
The passive evil through which suffering must be endured and that
overwhelms its victim more violently and cruelly than any intentional
violation of his personal integrity also renders suffering ‘useless’ as
the title of Levinas’s essay suggests: suffering is essentially pointless; it
is ‘for nothing’. But, curiously perhaps, for Levinas the uselessness of
suffering also accounts for the possibility of an ethics:
The evil of suffering – extreme passivity, powerlessness, abandonment and solitude –
is this not also what is unassumable and, accordingly, because of its non-integration
into the unity of an order or a sense, the possibility of an opening and, more
2 E. Levinas, ‘La souﬀrance inutile’, in Entre nous. Essais sur le penser-a`-l’autre
(Paris: Grasset, 1991) 107–119, at 108.
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precisely, an opening through which a moan, a cry, a groan, or a sigh passes, the
original appeal for aid, for healing help, for help of the other me whose alterity,
whose exteriority promises salvation?3
In Levinas’s terms, then, only by responding to the appeal of the
Other can intrinsically useless suffering become just within the ethical
perspective of the interhuman. Within this perspective, Levinas
identiﬁes two radically different types of suffering. There is the
suffering that resides in the Other. The Other’s suffering is unfor-
givable to me, and as such it solicits me and calls me demanding a
response. But there is also the suffering that is in me, my own em-
pathic experience of the suffering of the Other. The constitutional
uselessness of suffering can only take on a sense in me by becoming
my suffering for the suffering of the Other.4
Extrapolating an ethics from suffering would not seem to be the
most obvious thing to do. The aim of this essay is, however, not to
develop an elaborate theoretical account of how Levinas does this – it
has already been done by people more qualiﬁed than I5 – but to
isolate and investigate the single claim: confronting the phenomenon
of suﬀering introduces a cut or a wound that prevents me from to-
talising my world and thus allows the taking place of an ethics. The
opening does not establish ethics in any foundational way, let alone
prescribe what normative principles an ethics should include. It can
only make the event possible if and when I respond to the Other’s
appeal.
The decision to focus on suffering is also in part a criticism of a
romantic strain in contemporary jurisprudence that sees recent
developments in the theory of transitional justice as a possible solu-
tion to the perceived formal limitations of modern law.6 In a com-
panion text to this essay7, I have in much a similar way dealt with the
impossibility of unconditional forgiveness in the work of truth
commissions through the ﬁgure of the resentful and unforgiving
3 Levinas, supra n. 2, at 109–110 [PM: footnote omitted]. In this passage, the
French text reads couverture instead of ouverture, but this must be a misprint.
4 Levinas, supra n. 2, at 111.
5 See e.g. M. Diamantides, The Ethics of Suﬀering: Modern Law, Philosophy, and
Medicine (Aldershot/Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000).
6 An excellent collection of relevant essays – some, perhaps, more ‘romantic’ than
others – is E. Christodoulidis and S. Veitch, eds, Lethe’s Law. Justice, Law and Ethics
in Reconciliation (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart, 2001).
7 P. Minkkinen, ‘Ressentiment as Suﬀering: On Transitional Justice and the
Impossibility of Forgiveness’, Law and Literature 19/3 (2007), 513–531.
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victim. The persistent resentment of the victim is interpreted as a
prolongation of the original trauma to which he has been subjected.
In their attempts to ‘conditionalise’ forgiveness in exchange for
reconciliation and social restoration, truth commissions function very
much like the legal trials that they are meant to replace: both con-
textualise the events with narrative frameworks in order to give
meaning to the victim’s suﬀering.
Finally, this essay will attempt to develop a possible theoretical
afﬁnity between Levinas and Walter Benjamin. While its point of
departure is an admittedly limited and isolated reading of Levinas,
the essay will try to argue that the ethical dimension that Levinas
ﬁnds in the phenomenon of suffering is akin to a critical power that
Benjamin ascribes to all true art: the ‘expressionless’. This critical
power will be examined ﬁrst in relation to a renowned portrayal of
human agony in the visual arts and later through modern interpre-
tations of the same painting that have all tried to address the moral
and ethical ambiguities related to the phenomenon of suffering.
THE IMAGERY OF SUFFERING
The complex and intimate relationship between suffering and ethics
that Levinas identiﬁes can be illustrated through the imagery of
suffering, and especially through passion art in the Christian tradi-
tion.8 Being the popular culture of its day, the original aim of passion
art was to convey the teachings of the Church to the illiterate masses
through retables, prayer book illustrations, the Via Crucis and
stained glass windows. Only later did passion art take on the task of
addressing more profound religious truths.
As a form of passion art, cruciﬁxion images are immediately
recognisable as representations of suffering irrespective of the view-
er’s background. But as far as the above outlined Levinasian notion
of ‘useless’ suffering is concerned, they seem to be caught in a par-
adox. They are clearly empathic representations of the suffering of an
Other, of the man-God as fellow human being and neighbour. But at
8 On passion art in general, see J.H. Marrow, Passion Iconography in Northern
European Art of the Late Middle Ages and Early Renaissance: A Study of the
Transformation of Sacred Metaphor into Descriptive Narrative (Kortrijk: Van
Ghemmert, 1979). On Levinas and passion art, see M. Slaughter, ‘Levinas, Mercy
and the Middle Ages’, in M. Diamantides, ed., Levinas, Law, Politics (Abingdon/
New York, NY: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 49–69, at 60–63. Slaughter’s essay also
deals with Levinas’s views on art more generally.
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the same time, cruciﬁxion images betray the suffering they depict
because they can establish the empathic rapport between viewer and
the Other only through a supportive narrative of redemption.
There are two distinctly Christian themes at play here which,
however, are both culturally more relevant than the religious tradi-
tion from which they arise. Firstly, cruciﬁxes are not merely depic-
tions of suffering but, more speciﬁcally, images of it. This essay is,
then, less about cruciﬁxions as such but rather about ﬁgurations of
suffering, about ‘imaging’ suffering. The central claims should hold
true regardless of whether we are talking about medieval altarpieces
or contemporary news photos of the abused inmates of Abu Ghraib.
But the emphasis on ﬁguration and imagery is what might be con-
sidered as speciﬁcally Christian. Due to the centrality of the image,
the essay is, then, in part about what art theory (aesthetics or the
philosophy of art) might be able to contribute to the law and
humanities project.
The second interrelated Christian theme – once again culturally
more relevant than the religious tradition fromwhich the theme arises –
is the signiﬁcation of pain and suffering into something purposeful or
ennobling.9 Beginning with the mundane maxim of ‘ﬁnding strength in
adversity’, the pinnacle of this idea of ennoblement is Christian mar-
tyrdom and ‘redemption through blood’. The imposition of meaning
through the signiﬁcation of ‘imaged’ suﬀering establishes the utilitarian
narrative in which one suﬀers ‘for something’, an ultimately immoral
‘justiﬁed suﬀering’ that Levinas so vehemently opposes. In its legal
variants, suﬀering serves a purpose in the rectiﬁcation of wrongs by
assigning responsibility or in the continuation of a social order through
reconciliation. So with the help of a Levinasian starting point, a debate
in art theory hopefully ﬁnds a parallel in law.
One of the best known examples of religious popular culture turned
high art – later commercialised as countless reproductions at the
marketplace – is the cruciﬁxion scene of the Isenheim Altarpiece.10
Even though the altarpiece is well known as images, its history is far
from unambiguous. Painted by an artist known as Matthias Gru¨ne-
wald between 1512 and 1516, it was originally commissioned for the
chapel of a monastic hospital of the Antonite order near the village of
9 See, e.g., Romans 5:3–5, 1 Peter 2:19–20, 1 Peter 4:1.
10 M. Gru¨newald, Cruciﬁxion, central section of the Isenheim Altarpiece with
closed wings (1512–1515). Oil on panel, 269 307 cm. Muse´e d’Unterlinden, Col-
mar. On the Isenheim Altarpiece in general, see G. Richter, The Isenheim Altar:
Suﬀering and Salvation in the Art of Gru¨newald (Edinburgh: Floris, 1998).
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Isenheim in Alsace. Gru¨newald’s painted panels and the Late-Gothic
sculpture byNicolas vonHagenau (c. 1460-c. 1526) weremounted on a
wooden predella, and the cruciﬁxion made up the central panel of the
closed altarpiece. By opening and closing the folding wings, the altar-
piece provided three diﬀerent scenes for the various festive events in the
ecclesiastical calendar. The hospital was dedicated mainly to the
treatment of those aﬄicted by what was then known as ignis sacer or
‘St Anthony’s ﬁre’. The disease that was later ascribed to the poisonous
Claviceps purpurea fungus that infects rye ﬁrst brought about convul-
sive symptoms through its psychoactive alkaloids, but in its later stages
it often developed into violent skin eruptions leading to amputations
and possibly even death.11
After ‘St Anthony’s ﬁre’, today known as ergotism, became cur-
able and the hospital closed down, the altarpiece was dismantled. The
detached paintings and sculpted ﬁgures all survived the iconoclasm of
the Reformation in storage. Next they were rescued by local
government ofﬁcials from Robespierre’s revolutionary looters in
1793, and some half a century later they were moved to a former
Dominican convent that had been converted into a museum in
nearby Colmar some 75 km south of Strasbourg. Since then the
paintings have changed hands between the French and the Germans
at about the same rate as the province of Alsace until, after World
War II, they were returned to Colmar where they have remained.12
There is not that much that is known with certitude about the
artist. According to the authoritative version, the name ‘Gru¨newald’
is an error made by the German Baroque painter and art historian
Joachim von Sandrart in his encyclopedic presentation of German art
Teutsche Academie in 1675.13 The artist’s real name is allegedly
Mathis Gothart, usually followed by his matronym Nithart, born
sometime between 1470 and 1485 in Wu¨rzburg. This Bavarian city
was one of the epicenters of the Bauernkrieg, a popular uprising
aﬃliated with the Reformation made up of various peasant revolts in
11 On the hospital-context of the altarpiece, see A. Hayum, ‘The Meaning and
Function of the Isenheim Altarpiece: The Hospital Context Revisited’, The Art
Bulletin 59/4 (1977), 501–517.
12 On the Franco-German history of the altarpiece, see A. Stieglitz, ‘The
Reproduction of Agony: Toward a Reception-History of Gru¨newald’s Isenheim
Altar after the First World War’, Oxford Art Journal 12/2 (1989), 87–103.
13 Sandrart speaks of ‘Mattha¨us Gru¨newald, also known as Mattha¨us of As-
chaﬀenburg’. See J. Sandrart, Teutsche Academie der Bau-, Bild- und Mahlerey-
Ku¨nste. Band 2 (No¨rdlingen: Alfons Uhl, 1994), at 236–237.
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the early 16th century. Gothart Nithart was a relatively celebrated
artist and waterworks engineer in his own time and reportedly died of
the plague in 1528 in Halle after which he quickly fell into obscurity.
He was rediscovered only when the Isenheim Altarpiece, formerly
presumed to have been the product of the genius of Albrecht Du¨rer,
was attributed to Gothart Nithart towards the end of the 19th
century.14
According to another more disputed version of the story,
Gru¨newald and Gothart Nithart are, in fact, two separate individu-
als. Matthias Gru¨n or Gru¨newald, the relatively unknown painter of
the altarpiece, was deliberately confused with Gothart Nithart, the
renowned court painter, in order to assign Aryan credentials to an
unaccomplished artist who was not ﬁt to be the author of this
German masterpiece and who, to the further embarrassment of 20th
century German art historians, had married a Jewish woman.15 Only
a handful of paintings and sketches that have undeniably been
identiﬁed as Gru¨newald’s have survived.
Standing in larger-than-life proportions, the Isenheim cruciﬁxion
portrays the scenes at Golgotha in luminous colours against a dark
and menacing background. The ﬁve sets of ﬁgures are all painted
from slightly different perspectives and in varying scales. The centre
of the picture is dominated by the oversized cruciﬁx that also seems to
illuminate the ground on which the remaining ﬁgures stand. At the
far left, painted slightly from below, a swooning Mary is consoled
and supported by John the Evangelist, himself evidently struck by
grief. On their right, a diminutive Mary Magdalene, this time painted
from above, is lost in delirious prayer. On the right of the cross, the
sacriﬁcial lamb, the symbol of the Christ atoning for the sins of man,
bleeds into a chalice. And ﬁnally at the far right, John the Baptist has
arisen from the dead and stands serenely pointing his ﬁnger at the
Christ. The words ‘Illum oportet crescere me autem minui’ (‘He must
increase, but I must decrease’, John 3:30) are written beside
him. Some of the painting’s themes are evidently Gothic, but in its
14 An often cited historical authority on Gothart Nithart is H. Feuerstein,
Matthias Gru¨newald (Bonn: Verlag der Buchgemeinde, 1930). For a fascinating ac-
count of how both Du¨rer and Gru¨newald have been used in the construction of a
nationalist German identity, see K. Moxey, ‘Impossible Distance: Past and Present
in the Study of Du¨rer and Gru¨newald’, Art Bulletin LXXXVI/4 (2004), 750–763.
15 This is the claim made by German historian Hans Ju¨rgen Rieckenberg. See
H.J. Rieckenberg, ‘Zum Forschungsstand u¨ber die Biographie des Scho¨pfers des
Isenheimer Altars’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Bayerische Landesgeschichte 50 (1987), 180–196.
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naturalism and use of colour Gru¨newald’s cruciﬁxion is typically a
work inspired by the Renaissance. And so the painting has become a
paradigmatic exemplar of what has been called the Northern
Renaissance.16
After nearly 400 years of obscurity, the Isenheim Altarpiece was
rediscovered in the late 19th century and quickly recognised as a long
forgotten masterpiece. Although all panels of the polyptych have
been duly praised, particularly the staggering brutality with which the
suffering of the Christ is portrayed in the cruciﬁxion scene has
received the most attention. In 1904 the French decadent author
Joris-Karl Huysmans wrote an inﬂuential essay about the altarpiece
where he compares the Isenheim cruciﬁxion to another painting of
the cruciﬁxion by the same artist:
In the middle of the painting, the Christ, huge and disproportionate in relation to the
stature of the surrounding characters, is nailed on a poorly peeled tree that allows us
to see in places the fresh paleness of the wood, and the transversal branch that is
pulled by the hands twirls and draws […] the twisted curve of the arch. The body […]
is livid and glossy, punctuated by stains of blood, pricked like a chestnut shell by the
splinters from the canes that remain in the holes of the wounds; at the end of the
disproportionately long arms the hands move about in convulsions and claw the air;
the fetlocks of the knees are locked close together, and the feet, one clinched on the
other with a nail, are but a disjointed cluster of muscles on which the surrounding
ﬂesh and the toenails that have gone blue decay; and the head, contained in a
gigantic crown of thorns, it subsides on the chest making it bagged and rounded,
striped with the grille of the ribs. This would be a faithful counterpart of the Cru-
ciﬁxion of Karlsruhe if only the expression of the face was diﬀerent – indeed, here
Jesus no longer has the terrible grin of tetanus; the jaw does not twist, but it hangs,
detached, and the lips dribble. He is less terrifying but more humanly base, more
dead. In the panel of Karlsruhe, the brutality of the features that this senile thaw of
the mouth now betrays was redeemed by the terror of lockjaw, the shrill laughter.
But the man-God of Colmar is nothing more than a sad thief destined for the
gallows.17
Huysmans is drawing attention to the striking humanity of this
man-God who, in his suffering, is unable to bear the attributes of
godliness and divinity that most devotional paintings of the era
16 On the Northern Renaissance in general, see J. Snyder, Northern Renaissance
Art: Painting, Sculpture, the Graphic Arts from 1350 to 1575 (New York, NY: Harry
N. Abrams, 1985).
17 J.-K. Huysmans, Trois primitifs. Les Gru¨newald du Muse´e de Colmar, Le maıˆtre
de Fle´malle et la Florentine du Muse´e de Francfort-sur-le-Mein (Paris: Le´on Vanier,
1905), at 15–16. For a much more innocuous description of Gru¨newald’s cruciﬁxion
scene, see A. Burkhard, ‘The Isenheim Altar’, Speculum 9/1 (1934), 56–69, at 59.
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required the ﬁgure of the Christ to embody. Indeed, if we compare
the Isenheim cruciﬁxion to, for example, Italian Early Renaissance
paintings of the same era, we ﬁnd here nothing of the wiry physique
that later developed into the athletic Christ of High Renaissance who
conquers death through his sacriﬁce.18 This is the theological scandal:
Gru¨newald’s Christ, rotting away on the cross, is simply too human
for a world obsessed with deities and redemption. By emphasising the
scandal, that is, by dissociating the depicted suﬀering from
the mythological and theological framework that is provided by the
narrative of the cruciﬁxion, the ethical underpinnings of the image
become more apparent. Once the framework and the accompanying
mythological narrative have been isolated, the Christ is left to suﬀer
‘for nothing’.
Gru¨newald’s painting can, of course, be considered simply as a
masterful exemplar of Christian devotional art, but the ability to
concentrate on the Christ’s suffering and, at the same time, to
defocus away from the Christian mythology that surrounds the
imagery is why it has been able to speak to secular modernity.
Consequently, the newly-found Isenheim Altarpiece quickly became
a standard point of reference for 20th century art.19 In 1930 Pablo
Picasso completed a small painting entitled Cruciﬁxion,20 and in 1932
a series of ink drawings and studies followed that were explicitly
attributed to the inﬂuence of Gru¨newald’s cruciﬁxion.21 Most com-
mentators extend Gru¨newald’s inﬂuence to Picasso’s masterpiece
from 1937, Guernica.22
18 See, e.g., L. Signorelli, The Cruciﬁxion with St Mary Magdalene (c. 1495–1500).
Oil on canvas, 247 165 cm. Galleria degli Uﬃzi, Florence.
19 A well-known 20th century painting that makes direct reference to the Isenheim
Altarpiece is O. Dix, War Triptych (1929–1932). Tempera on wood, central panel
204 204 cm, side panels 204 102 cm each. Gema¨ldegalerie Neue Meister, Dres-
den.
20 P. Picasso, Cruciﬁxion (1930). Oil on wood, 51 66 cm. Muse´e national
Picasso, Paris. See R. Kaufmann, ‘Picasso’s Cruciﬁxion of 1930’, The Burlington
Magazine 111/798 (1969), 553–561.
21 P. Picasso, Cruciﬁxion after Gru¨newald (1932). Eight inkwashes and ink
drawings, 34 51 cm each. Muse´e national Picasso, Paris. See L. Ullmann, Picasso
und der Krieg (Bielefeld: Karl Kerber, 1993), at 44–47.
22 P. Picasso, Guernica (1937). Oil on canvas, 349 776 cm. Museo Nacional
Centro de Arte Reina Sofı´a, Madrid. On the much-debated political context of the
painting, see W. Hofmann, ‘Picasso’s ‘‘Guernica’’ in Its Historical Context’, Artibus
et Historiae 4/7 (1983), 141–169.
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Diane Apostolos-Cappadona argues that although Gru¨newald’s
vision of agony and suffering inﬂuenced Picasso’s work throughout
the 1930s, Picasso only attempted to capture the ‘haptic’ content of
the painting, that is, the ‘emotive physicality of the human body’,
while at the same time he clearly disregarded its religious content.
Furthermore, Apostolos-Cappadona insists that Picasso did not draw
his vision of haptic agony from the tortured body of the Christ but
from Mary Magdalene at the foot of the cross:
[…] his vision was empathetic to the agonized hapticity of the Magdalen. Thus,
Picasso emphasized all he thought available in the modern world: the cathartic
experience of art and the sensitive dynamism of woman. Even in the age of secular
spirituality, the theme of the ‘essence of agony’ continued to be reinterpreted through
the hapticity of the female body.23
While plausible, Apostolos-Cappadona’s interpretation is only
possible if the ﬁgure of the cruciﬁed Christ is downplayed as one of
Picasso’s motifs. This may well be the case in the 1930 painting, but
the ink drawings and studies from 1932 that are explicitly attributed
to Gru¨newald’s inﬂuence would call for quite a different reading.
Indeed, a recent exhibition catalogue notes that although the themes
of the 1930 oil painting and the 1932 ink drawings are the same, the
focus has clearly changed. Picasso now concentrates speciﬁcally on
the motif of the cruciﬁed Christ while the accompanying ﬁgures that
were central in the oil painting are now either ‘vaguely insinuated by
a few ink traces’ or indistinct white silhouettes against the black
background. But the theme of the cruciﬁxion is merely a source for
Picasso to develop his own vocabulary of pain and suffering that a
few years later culminated in Guernica.24 Even when working with the
cruciﬁxion theme, Picasso’s secularised vision of Christian iconog-
raphy seems to trace the essence of suﬀering in the ‘haptic’ physicality
of the Christ’s agonised body, and it can do so only by bracketing out
the religious narrative that traditionally saturates the imagery. By
doing so, Picasso the self-professed atheist reiterates the theological
scandal that is already potentially present in the Isenheim Altarpiece.
23 D. Apostolos-Cappadonna, ‘The Essence of Agony: Gru¨newald’s Inﬂuence on
Picasso’, Artibus et Historiae 13/26 (1992), 31–47, at 44.
24 F. Calvo Serraller and C. Gime´nez, eds, Spanish Painting from El Greco to
Picasso: Time, Truth and History (New York, NY: Solomon R. Guggenheim
Museum, 2006), at 386–391.
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SUFFERING WITHOUT NARRATIVE
Francis Bacon decontextualises the cruciﬁxion motif from its myth-
ological and narrative framework in a very similar way. More
immediately inﬂuenced by Picasso’s art of the 1930s in general than
any single work, Bacon’s relationship with Gru¨newald is in a manner
of speaking mediated.25 Bacon painted his ﬁrst cruciﬁxion as early as
1933, and later the cruciﬁxion developed into one of the most
important themes of his art. Not only is the cruciﬁxion a central motif
for Bacon, but he also painted his most important cruciﬁxion
paintings as triptychs which was, of course, one of the preferred
forms of medieval devotional art such as altarpieces. But despite these
seemingly obvious Christian references, Bacon’s art conveys quite a
diﬀerent message. John Russell recounts the eﬀect that Bacon’s ﬁrst
widely acknowledged painting Three Studies for Figures at the Base of
a Cruciﬁxion26 had when it was ﬁrst exhibited at the Lefevre Gallery
in London in April 1945:
Their [PM: the ﬁgures’] anatomy was half-human, half-animal, and they were con-
ﬁned in a low-ceilinged, windowless and oddly proportioned space. They could bite,
probe, and suck, and they had very long eel-like necks, but their functioning in other
respects was mysterious. Ears and mouths they had, but two at least were sightless.
One was unpleasantly bandaged.27
The 1944 Three Studies remains the most important of Bacon’s
cruciﬁxion triptychs. The panels portray three fury-like ﬁgures glee-
fully witnessing an apparent cruciﬁxion that is itself manifestly absent
notwithstanding the painting’s name. By contrast, in Three Studies
for a Cruciﬁxion28 nearly two decades later, the right-hand panel,
often attributed to the inﬂuence of 13th century Florentine artist
25 When questioned about the inﬂuence of German and Dutch Renaissance
painters, Bacon replies: ‘They mean nothing to me.’ F. Bacon, Entretiens avec Michel
Archimbaud (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), at 37. On the other hand, Wieland Schmied
explicitly lists Gru¨newald as an immediate inﬂuence, but perhaps as a descendant of
the ‘primitives’ celebrated by Andre´ Breton and others rather than as a represen-
tative of the Northern Renaissance. See W. Schmied, Francis Bacon: Commitment
and Conﬂict (Munich/New York, NY: Prestel, 1996), at 73.
26 F. Bacon, Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Cruciﬁxion (1944). Oil and
pastel on hardboard. Three panels, 94 74 cm each. Tate Modern, London.
27 J. Russell, Francis Bacon (London: Thames Hudson, 1971), at 10.
28 F. Bacon, Three Studies for a Cruciﬁxion (1962). Oil with sand on canvas. Three
panels, 198 145 cm each. Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York.
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Cimabue, depicts the cruciﬁed body. By decentering the deformed
carcass, Bacon has pulled the focus to the right destabilising the
alleged aesthetic power of the triptychal form. Finally, in Cruciﬁx-
ion29 from 1965, the view focuses unambiguously on the cruciﬁed
carcass in the centre panel, and the tensions of the painting are for the
most part created between the drama of the cruciﬁxion and the
casualness with which the identiﬁable human ﬁgures portrayed in the
outer panels observe the events.30
Russell points out that for Bacon a ‘cruciﬁxion’ is neither a
descriptive title nor a reference to an actual event. It is a ‘generic
name for an environment in which bodily harm is done to one or
more persons and one or more persons gather to watch’.31 What does
this imply? Firstly, then, Bacon’s art is as much about inﬂicting pain
as it is about the experience of suﬀering, and this introduces the
ethical ambiguity against which both Bacon’s critics and his public
have strongly reacted. In the absence of clear moral direction, Ba-
con’s cruciﬁxion theme has often been interpreted as a vehicle for the
artist’s personal cynicism. Secondly, Bacon’s witnesses, the furies that
voluntarily gather to observe the inﬂiction of pain at the base of the
cruciﬁxion, are entranced and mesmerised by what they are seeing.
This voyeurism can only re-enforce the ethical ambiguity that the
paintings are said to represent.32
If Picasso was initially more interested in the ﬁgure of Mary
Magdalene deliriously praying at the foot of the cross in Gru¨newald’s
painting, Bacon focuses on the complex emotional and sensory ties
that bind the spectator to the cruciﬁed carcass, be it visible or not.
Anti-religious rather than atheist, Bacon often stressed that his
paintings portray ‘a’ and not ‘the’ cruciﬁxion. Although he was
himself well aware that adopting the cruciﬁxion theme may impose
into his art the narrative or literary structures that he deplored as a
non-ﬁgurative artist, he comments that:
29 F. Bacon, Cruciﬁxion (1965). Oil on canvas. Three panels, 197 147 cm each.
Staatsgalerie Moderner Kunst, Munich.
30 Bacon painted a fourth cruciﬁxion triptych which, however, is inconsequential
for the discussion here. F. Bacon, Second Version of Triptych 1944 (1988). Oil and
acrylic on canvas. Three panels, 198 147 cm each. Tate Modern, London.
31 Russell, supra n. 27, at 113.
32 Bacon identiﬁed these spectators as kin to the Oresteian Eumenides. See
D. Sylvester, Interviews with Francis Bacon (New York, NY: Thames Hudson,
2004), at 44–46.
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[…] I haven’t found another subject so far that has been as helpful for covering
certain areas of human feeling and behaviour. Perhaps it is only because so many
people have worked on this particular theme that it has created this armature – I
can’t think of a better way of saying it – on which one can operate all types of level of
feeling.33
Bacon’s reference to the armature of the plastic arts34 seems to
suggest that the cruciﬁxion theme is merely a skeletal structure sup-
porting his aesthetics rather than an expressly articulated moral or
ethical condemnation of the human condition as, for example, the
1944 Three Studies was often seen in the aftermath of World War II.
The armature implies a similar disjointing of the image from the
narrative context of the cruciﬁxion as in the case of Picasso. But
Didier Anzieu notes that, in Bacon’s treatment of the cruciﬁxion
theme, one can still recognise the traces of a sacred history. But it is a
history that has not lived up to its promise of redemption. It is a
Christian history, but Anglican rather than Catholic or Orthodox, an
insular rather than a Mediterranean reading of it.35 It is suﬀering but
left without the promised redemption, and the emphasis given to the
betrayal is what Anzieu identiﬁes as being particularly English about
Bacon’s art. Gilles Deleuze, on the other hand, uses the notion of
‘isolating the Figure’ to designate Bacon’s art as an intermediate
‘realist’ position between the ﬁgurative and the non-ﬁgurative:
The ﬁgurative (representation) implies namely the relationship of an image to an
object that it allegedly illustrates; but it also implies the relationship of an image with
other images within a composite whole that precisely delivers to each its object.
Narration is the correlate of illustration. A history will always slide or attempt to
slide between two ﬁgures in order to animate the illustrated whole. Isolation is, then,
the simplest way, necessary albeit insufﬁcient, to break away from representation, to
break the narration, to prevent illustration, to liberate the Figure: to stick with the
facts.36
In the triptychal form, Bacon often brings together elements that
are originally unrelated. Firstly, there is the historical dimension of
the form and its religious connotations as a direct reference to the
medieval winged altarpieces such as Gru¨newald’s. But secondly, as a
33 Sylvester, supra n. 32, at 44.
34 An armature is a standing supportive framework often made of wire around
which wax or clay is then sculpted.
35 D. Anzieu and M. Monjauze, Francis Bacon, ou le portrait de l’homme de´sespe´ce´
(Paris: Seuil/Archimbaud, 2004), at 60–61.
36 G. Deleuze, Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (Paris: Seuil, 2002), at 12
[PM: footnote deleted].
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clearly modern reference, the three panels also suggest a panoramic
view that envelops the viewer from three sides. The two conﬂicting
elements bring about the contradiction that isolates the image from
the narrative. As Wieland Schmied notes:
Whereas the ﬁrst element establishes a sense of distance and makes the picture look
remote and unapproachable, the second feature is intended to have exactly the
opposite effect: the viewer is confronted directly with the work, which encircles him
and forces him to engage with it. These contradictions are compounded by a further
element which offered Bacon the possibility of breaking down a complex pictorial
situation into separate components and dealing with several corresponding ﬁgures,
while at the same time retaining the option of cutting the narrative thread at will and
mercilessly expunging any hint of narrative coherence that threatened to creep into
the picture.37
Although Bacon was never too keen to discuss his own art in
abstract and generalised terms, he had an interest in the theoretical
writings of Michel Leiris who also became a close friend. Russell
traces Leiris’s initial inﬂuence to a book on bullﬁghting that Bacon
received from the author shortly after their ﬁrst encounter.38 In a
central passage allegedly highlighted by Bacon, Leiris quotes Bau-
delaire and claims that beauty is only possible if something accidental
or contingent intervenes producing an imperfection or a crack that
releases beauty from its glacial and stagnant state. For Leiris, beauty
is not simply an intelligible combination of opposing elements. In
their reciprocal antagonism, one element tends to erupt actively in its
opposite ‘making its mark like a wound, like damage’. Beauty may
suggest the existence of an ideal and logical order, but this order must
always include within itself the seed of its own destruction. Or if it is
the destructive element that is identiﬁed as beauty, then it must be
illuminated by something ideal:
Thus beauty that only exists as a function of what self-destructs and regenerates itself
will sometimes appear as a calmness that is consumed by the potential of a storm,
sometimes as a frenzy that sets itself into order aiming to contain its inner tempest
behind an emotionless mask. Beauty will always occur between these two poles
acting as living forces: on the one hand, the right element of immortal, sovereign, and
sculpted beauty; on the other hand, the left sinister element associated with mis-
fortune, accident, and sin.39
37 Schmied, supra n. 25, at 76.
38 Russell, supra n. 27, at 88–90. See also A. Daki, ‘Leiris/Bacon, une amitie´ a`
l’œuvre’, Revue de litte´rature compare´e No 306 (2003), 169–181 and Bacon, supra n.
25, at 110–113.
39 M. Leiris, Miroir de la tauromachie (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1981), at 36–37.
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In a text speciﬁcally dedicated to Bacon, Leiris comments that
Bacon’s cruciﬁxions limit their thematic relationship with the man
on the cross to the carcass that has been hung up on display
without reference to either the myth or the melodrama. Bacon’s
triptychs are all the result of secularising and updating ancient
religious paintings that made the connection between the man-God
and the resurrected body through the act of crucifying. But all that
remains of this iconographic imagery is its ‘majestic ordinance
[ordonnance majestueuse]’. It is now complemented with a very
diﬀerent content including nothing that could be summarised in a
cold and logical account. Bacon may, for example, append minor
motifs to the painting, but they are not the saintly ﬁgures or
peasant scenes traditionally found at the base of the cross or in its
background. In Leiris’s view, the Christian iconographic tradition
may deﬁne the architecture of Bacon’s triptychs, but it is present
only as a purely formal structure.40 Leiris’s insistence on formality
and structure are reminiscent of Bacon’s own metaphor of the
‘armature’.
Leiris insists that in Bacon’s cruciﬁxions the events as narrated
by the Evangelists have been banished from the paintings. In their
stead is a ‘seal of blood’ in the furies that dominate most of
Bacon’s triptychal cruciﬁxions. But even if such compositions are
undoubtedly marked with a tragic character, Leiris maintains that
Bacon’s tragedy takes place in the absence of all pathos and
without a single element of theatricality. Only the rigidity of the
general structure is set into play with the ‘marmorised consistency’
of the presented ﬁgures, and this, Leiris explains, conforms to the
very nature of tragedy. But unlike drama where actions are ani-
mated by sentiments and circumstances, the tragedy that Bacon
portrays constructs its characters from a single block and makes
them puppets of their obligations or misfortunes. This is how
Bacon makes manifest his profoundly realist spirit even when
working with elements of myth:
[…] what he shows us does nothing but exists there, epiphanically, and with a texture
that is too dense for us to be able to reject it.41
Leiris’s aesthetics may lack the humanistic appeal of Levinas’s
philosophy, but both are explicitly opposed to a totalising tradition
40 M. Leiris, Francis Bacon, face et proﬁl (Paris: Albin Michel, 2004), at 48–49.
41 Leiris, supra n. 40, at 130.
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of thinking. Leiris’s ‘left’ element pierces the totality of an ideal order
leaving it wounded in much a similar way as the suffering that, for
Levinas, is unable to take on meaning. The aesthetical wound that
enables beauty to take place also provides the cut through which the
ethical call of true art can be heard. In Bacon’s triptychs, the call
places the viewer in the paradoxical position where he has no option
but to identify himself with the voyeur-ghouls at the foot of the cross
and, consequently, to acknowledge his ambiguous double-role in
witnessing pain. The scene of suffering both attracts and repels; it
enables both condemnation of and participation in the suffering of
the Other. And it is between these opposing poles that an ethics can
take place.
SUFFERING, ETHICS AND THE EXPRESSIONLESS
Gru¨newald’s painting of the cruciﬁxion has reportedly also been on
the wall or desk of numerous thinkers. For example, the Swiss
theologian Karl Barth who always kept a picture of the painting
above his bedside table developed his notion of God as the ‘wholly
Other’ (das ganz Andere) with reference to the dialectic of the Christ
and John the Baptist in the painting.42 More recently Jean-Luc
Nancy has written a short essay on some theological aspects of the
altarpiece that Martin Buber originally brought up.43
Gershom Scholem recounts that Walter Benjamin also had a
picture of the Isenheim Altarpiece on the wall of his study for many
years. In 1913 Benjamin had made a special visit to Colmar to see the
original paintings. Scholem observes that in Benjamin’s notes from
42 See e.g. K. Barth, Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes. Prolegomena zur christlichen
Dogmatik. Gesamtausgabe. Band 14 (Zu¨rich: Theologischer Verlag, 1982), at 340–341.
On God as the wholly Other and Barth’s dialectical theology, see K. Barth, ‘Das Wort
Gottes als Aufgabe der Theologie’, in Vortra¨ge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922–1925.
Gesamtausgabe. Band 19 (Zu¨rich: Theologischer Verlag, 1990) 144–175.
43 See M. Buber, ‘Der Altar’, in Hinweise gesammelte Essays (Zu¨rich: Manesse,
1953) 27–29, J.-L. Nancy, ‘Athe´ologie chromatique’, in S. Lecoq-Ramond, ed.,
Histoire du Muse´e d’Unterlinden et de ses collections: de la Re´volution a` la Premie`re
guerre mondiale (Colmar: Socie´te´ Schongauer – Muse´e d’Unterlinden, 2003) 391–398.
Both have been published in English in Journal of Visual Culture 4/1 (2005) 116–128.
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that period, he is beginning to address the overwhelming power of the
paintings as what he would come to call the expressionless (das
Ausdruckslose).44 Indeed, in an essay a few years after his visit,
Benjamin speciﬁcally comments on how Gru¨newald paints his sacred
ﬁgures. Sanctity is depicted in the radiance of the halos but, Benjamin
concludes, the radiant can be true and expressionless only if it is
refracted from the nocturnal.45 This is what Gru¨newald seems to be
doing in the Isenheim Altarpiece where the cruciﬁed Christ provides
the light in the painting.
In her analysis of historical court trials, Shoshana Felman uses
Benjamin’s notion of the expressionless to depict the mute traumas
that the language of law will never be able to articulate. At the same
time, she notes a possible theoretical afﬁnity between Benjamin and
Levinas:
[…] expressionless […] are those whom violence has deprived of expression; those
who, on the one hand, have been historically reduced to silence, and who, on the
other hand, have been historically made faceless, deprived of their human face –
deprived, that is, not only of a language and a voice but even of the mute expression
always present in a living human face.46
In Felman’s reading, the expressionless seems to be for the most
part another way of accounting for the disempowerment of the
traumatised victim. The expressionless is a human ﬁgure that has
been denied his humanity because he is victimised into silence, and
consequently the victim also loses his ability to express his humanity.
Such a humanistic reading of Benjamin is problematic on a number
of accounts, but especially because it makes such a concrete reading
of the Ho¨lderlinian caesura that is at the heart of Benjamin’s
theory.47 Ho¨lderlin annotated his two translations of Sophocles with
notes where he discusses how in both tragedies Tiresias’s intervention
acts as a caesura that interrupts the ‘calculable law’ of the tragic
structure:
44 G. Scholem,Walter Benjamin – die Geschichte einer Freundschaft (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), at 51–52.
45 W. Benjamin, ‘Sokrates’, in Gesammelte Schriften. Band II Æ I (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1977) 129–132, at 130.
46 S. Felman, The Juridical Unconscious. Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth
Century (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2002), at 13. See,
however, Felman, ibid., at 184–185, notes 114 and 116.
47 Felman, supra n. 46, at 163–164.
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At such a moment, the man forgets himself and the God, and turns around,
admittedly in a holy way, like a traitor – At the extreme limit of suffering, nothing
indeed remains but the conditions of time or space.48
Claudia Wegener hears in Ho¨lderlin’s words how the extreme
limits of suffering drawn by the caesura form the enclosure and
limiting interiority of the agon, and this is where Levinas steps in once
again:
This interiority at the outer limit – agonia, agony, the struggle unto death – is also an
opening to and an approaching of the other, and thus, perhaps, an opening to some
kind of communion.49
In the famous passage on the expressionless in his essay on Goe-
the’s novel Elective Aﬃnities, Benjamin begins by noting that while
creation produces a world from nothingness, art always emerges from
chaos. Art will never be able to completely escape its chaotic origins
because it cannot make anything out of it. Instead art enchants chaos
into the world, but only for a ﬂeeting moment. For if the chaotic
became truly alive, it would soon transform everything into mere
semblance. For Benjamin, it is the expressionless in true art that
interrupts the movement of beauty and harmony that would other-
wise run the risk of turning art into mere semblance and petrifying it
into a single moment:
48 F. Ho¨lderlin, ‘Anmerkungen zum Oedipus’, in Sa¨mtliche Werke. Fu¨nfter
Band. U¨bersetzungen (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1952) 193–202, at 202. See also
F. Ho¨lderlin, ‘Anmerkungen zur Antigona¨’, in Sa¨mtliche Werke. Fu¨nfter Band.
U¨bersetzungen (Stuttgart:W.Kohlhammer, 1952) 263–273. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
has provided an inﬂuential contemporary reading of Ho¨lderlin’s caesura situating it
within the political context of modernity. See P. Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘La ce´sure du
spe´culatif’, in L’imitation des modernes. Typographies II (Paris: Galile´e, 1986) 39–69
and P. Lacoue-Labarthe, La ﬁction du politique: Heidegger, l’art et la politique (Paris:
Cristian Bourgois Editeur, 1987), at 64–72.
49 C. Wegener, ‘A Music of Translation’, MLN 115/5, Comparative Literature
Issue (2000), 1052–1084, at 1066. Blanchot addresses this moment of the caesura as
the ‘reversal’ (retournement). See M. Blanchot, ‘L’itine´raire de Ho¨lderlin’, in L’espace
litte´raire (Paris: Gallimard, 1955) 363–374. Further on Ho¨lderlin: ‘While rhythm
disengages the multiple from the unity that eludes it, while it appears regular and
seems to set its pace according to the rule, rhythm however threatens the rule because
the former always exceeds the latter through a reversal: even if rhythm is at play or in
operation within measure, it cannot be measured in it.’ M. Blanchot, L’e´criture du
de´sastre (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), at 173–174.
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The expressionless is the critical power [Gewalt] which, while unable to separate
semblance from essence in art, prevents them from mingling. It possesses this power
as a moral dictum. In the expressionless, the sublime power of the true appears as
that which determines the language of the real world according to the laws of the
moral world. For it shatters whatever still survives the legacy of chaos in all beautiful
semblance: the false, errant totality – the absolute totality. Only the expressionless
completes the work, by shattering it into a thing of shards, into a fragment of the true
world, into the torso of a symbol.50
Just as the caesura, Benjamin’s expressionless is the breach or
interruptive silence that enables a work of art to reveal its innermost
essence. In Goethe’s novel, the caesura is represented by Ottilie, a
beautiful and silent woman, whose qualities are then restated in
Benjamin’s interpretation of the artwork’s – in this case the novel’s –
expressionless and silent beauty. In the silence of the caesura ‘…
harmony and with it all expression collapses in order to make room
for an expressionless power that is inherent in all artistic media’.51
In Gru¨newald’s Cruciﬁxion, the expressionless is the brutal expe-
rience of suﬀering that cannot be narrated. Not because a silenced
Christ nailed to the cross has been denied the ability or possibility to
express his torment as Felman’s reading might suggest, but because
even after every detail of the painting, after every element of attri-
bute, composition and colour has been accurately depicted and ac-
counted for, a residue remains, an ethical truth that cannot be
appropriated but that nevertheless calls for a response. In much a
similar way, a residue will always remain after the law has attempted
to bring meaning to the atrocities committed through its causal
narratives. The suﬀering of the individual will, in the end, remain
expressionless, meaningless, and ‘for nothing’. As such, its appeal
calling for my response is much louder than anything the trial will
invoke through its choreographed proceedings.
Gru¨newald’s suffering Christ is not deprived of his humanity. On
the contrary, he is radically human. His radical humanity interrupts
50 W. Benjamin, ‘Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften’, in Gesammelte Schriften.
Band I Æ I (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974) 123–201, at 181.
51 Benjamin, supra n. 50, at 182. On Benjamin’s Ho¨lderlinian aﬃnities in general,
see B. Hanssen, ‘‘‘Dichtermut’’ and ‘‘Blo¨digkeit’’: Two Poems by Ho¨lderlin Inter-
preted by Walter Benjamin’, MLN 112/5, Comparative Literature Issue (1997), 786–
816. A further example of the literary expressionless could, perhaps, be Marguerite
Duras’s novel The Ravishing of Lol Stein (1964) where the painful numbness of the
protagonist’s loveless life is at the same time literature’s inability to express her
suﬀering in narrative form.
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the totality of the Christian myth; it questions me and summons me
in its appeal, putting me into question. The Other’s expressionless
suffering resists my attempts to conceive of my existence within a
totalising whole because it refuses to drain its meaning into my efforts
to assimilate it into my world. The Other calls to me: ‘My suffering is
always more than you can imagine.’ And by doing so, the Other
reafﬁrms the majesty and highness that will always be her position in
relation to me.
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Matthias Grünewald, Crucifixion, central section of the Isenheim Altarpiece 
with closed wings (1512-1515). Oil on panel, 269 x 307 cm. Musée 
d’Unterlinden, Colmar. 
 
 
 
Pablo Picasso, Crucifixion after Grünewald (1932). India ink on paper, 34 x 
51 cm. Musée national Picasso, Paris. 
  
 
 
 
 
       
 
Francis Bacon, Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion 
(1944). Oil and pastel on hardboard. Three panels, 94 x 74 cm each. Tate 
Modern, London. 
